Subset sum problem is a classical NP-hard problem viewed as a candidate to design quantum-resistant cryptography. Cryptographic constructions based on extended modular subset sum problems are proposed subsequently in recent years. In this paper, we propose an improved broadcast attack against subset sum problems via lattice oracle. We reduce multi-dimensional (modular) subset sum problems to BDD oracle and present an explicit relationship among parameters. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first analysis on the trade-off between the efficiency of broadcast attacks and the number of obtained ciphertexts on subset sum problems. We implement our broadcast attack using LLL and BKZ algorithm and show experimentally that our method is quite practical. Furthermore, our algorithm is applicable to those low-weight subset sum problems which some cryptographic schemes are based on. We claim that our attack is efficient for both binary encoding and powerline encoding under certain parameter settings.
Introduction
Subset sum problem is a classical NP-hard problem and has been considered as an alternative to factoring and discrete logarithm problem to design public key cryptosystems. The subset sum problem, also known as knapsack problem, is defined as: given a set of positive integers { a 1 , , a n } and a target sum s , find a subset of a i 's that exactly sum up to s . If we write a = (a 1 , · · · , a n ) , the subset sum problem asks to find x = (x 1 , · · · , x n ) ∈ { 0 , 1 } n such that a 1 x 1 + a 2 x 2 + · · · + a n x n = s.
The appealing of subset sum problem to cryptographers depends on its two outstanding features. On one hand, computing the subset sum function can be done within a few addition operations, which is quite efficient. On the other, there is no known polynomial time quantum algorithm that can break subset sum problem, which is distinguished from factoring and discrete logarithm [34] .
Merkle and Hellman proposed the first instantiated public key cryptosystem based on subset sum problem in 1978 [22] . Since then, an army of public key encryption schemes based on subset sum problem have been proposed. The pity is that most of these proposals have been broken subsequently. They are mainly subject to two classes of attacks. One class heavily relies on the specific structure of the proposed trapdoor, such as Shamir's polynomial attack on Merkle-Hellman system [33] and Brickell's attack on multi-iterated Merkle-Hellman scheme [7] . The other class deals with generic knapsacks with large weight via lattice algorithms, which is also known as low-density attack [1, 6, 12, 17, 18] .
In order to avoid low-density attack, some schemes selected low-weight knapsacks in their encryption [11, 26] where the Hamming weight of the plaintext is fixed. It can be generalized to powerline encoding where the plaintext is a vector belonging to N n with fixed coordinate sum.
Besides, there are still some cryptographic constructions based on subset sum problems remaining secure today including the universal one-way hash functions, pseudorandom generators and bit-commitment schemes [16] . Moreover, a provably secure scheme based on modular subset sum problem was proposed by Ajtai and Dwork [4] . Since then, lattice-based cryptosystems with the worst-case hardness were developed in succession [20, 28, 31, 32] . In some sense, their underlying problems can be viewed as extended subset sum problems.
Broadcast attack is a classical technique, proposed by Håstad in 1988, to analyze public key cryptosystems. It is applied in the scenario where a sender encrypts a single message by different public keys of multiple recipients. This attack enables an attacker to recover the message from the ciphertexts without any knowledge of these recipients' secret keys. Usually, the efficiency of broadcast attack is related to the number of ciphertexts which are referred to as challenges .
Related work
The hardness of a single subset sum problem can be reduced to either a CVP problem of the orthogonal lattice with a constructed target vector [25] , or an SVP oracle of the embedded lattice for density < 0.9408 [12] . Plantard and Susilo constructed a broadcast attack against knapsack problems exploiting lattice intersections to enlarge the parameter of uSVP [29] . A broadcast attack via SVP oracle was proposed in [27] later. However, both works do not present relations between the power of oracle and the number of required challenges. Lattice algorithms for single low-weight subset sum problems were discussed in [25] . We will explore further on those low-weight knapsack problems with multiple challenges.
Our contribution
In this paper, we construct a broadcast attack on subset sum problems via BDD (or uSVP) oracle. By an improved analysis of the orthogonal lattice, we give an explicit relationship between the parameter γ in BDD 1/ γ oracle and the number of required challenges, which are two crucial factors impacting on the efficiency of broadcast attacks. Our work will lead to a better understanding of subset sum problems, and can be used to quantify the security of relevant cryptosystems more precisely.
Moreover, we implemented our attack using LLL and BKZ algorithm and show experimentally that our method is practical because it suffices to recover the solution from only a small number of challenges. We also apply our attack to low-weight subset sum problems used in Okamoto-Tanaka-Uchiyama scheme [26] , and claim that our attack is efficient for certain parameters.
We note that our result on modular subset sum problem will help to explore secure parameter setting for modular knapsack based cryptography theoretically, especially for those vectorial modular subset sum problems such as SIS (Small Integer Solution) problem [2, 15] .
Roadmap
We start in Section 2 with some notations and basic facts. In Section 3 , we report on our reduction from multidimensional subset sum problem to BDD and apply our method to low-weight subset sum problem in Section 4 . We discuss modular subset sum problem in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6 .
Preliminary
We denote by · the Euclidean norm and · , · the inner product in R n . Let 1 n be the vector in R n with entries all 1's. For a finite set E , we denote by U ( E ) the uniform distribution over E . Let [ B ] = N ∩ [0 , B ] for B > 0. We write vectors of R n in the form of columns.
Definition 1 (Lattice) . Given m linearly independent vectors
as a basis of the lattice L . We say that the rank of the lattice is m and the dimension is n . If n = m, the lattice is called a full-rank lattice .
Definition 2 (Determinant)
. Given a lattice L and its basis B , the determinant of L is defined as det L = det (B T B ) , which equals the volume of the fundamental parallelepiped
We denote by B n (r) and S n −1 (r) the n -dimensional ball and sphere of radius r centered at the origin respectively.
Definition 3 (Successive Minima
] ࢨ{0}, we define the i th successive minimum as the radius of the smallest sphere containing at least i linearly independent lattice vectors, i.e.
We now recall two most basic computational problems involving lattices, SVP and CVP. Both SVP and CVP are NP-hard problems [3, 35] .
Definition 5 (SVP)
. Given a lattice L , the shortest vector problem(SVP) is to find v ∈ L such that v = λ 1 (L ) .
Definition 6 (CVP)
. Given a lattice L and target vector t , the closest vector problem(CVP) is to find v ∈ L such that v − t ≤ u − t for arbitrary u ∈ L .
There are lattice attacks known as low-density attacks on generic subset sum problems. In the whole paper, we denote by log the logarithm function with base 2 and d the density of the subset sum problem, i.e. d = n log B . Lemma 2.1. Let B be a positive integer, and a 1 , a 2 , , a n be uniformly random integers in [1, B ] . Let e = (e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n ) ∈ { 0 , 1 } n be arbitrary, and s = n i =1 a i e i . If the density d < 0 . 9408 . . . , then the subset sum problem defined by ( a 1 , a 2 , , a n ; s ) can be solved in polynomial time with a single call to an SVP oracle. Furthermore, the subset sum problem of ( a 1 , a 2 , , a n ; s ) can be solved with a single call to a CVP oracle independently of the density.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 in [12] and Lemma 2 in [25] , we complete the proof directly.
We have the following reductions between BDD 1/ γ and uSVP [5, 19] :
where ε = (1 /n ) . As γ increases, the BDD 1/ γ (or uSVP γ ) instance becomes easier, which implies a lower requirement for the algorithm to solve it.
The most popular tool to estimate the number of lattice points in a set is the so-called Gaussian Heuristic [10, 14] .
Gaussian Heuristic . Given a lattice L and a "nice" set S , the number of points in
We denote by N B (n, r) the number of integer points in B n (r) . From Gaussian Heuristic, we have that N B (n, r) is proportional to r n for large radius r and the hidden constant coefficient is π n/ 2 (n/ 2+1) .
Broadcast attack against subset sum problem
In this section, we are to expound our broadcast attack against subset sum problem by reducing multi-dimensional subset sum problem to BDD and show the efficiency experimentally.
Given k challenges, all we need is to recover the solution e = (e 1 , e 2 
Let A = (a i, j ) be the coefficient matrix, which is a uniformly random matrix of [ B ] k × n , and s = (s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n ) ∈ Z n . We are interested in the case where 2 log 2 n ≤ B ≤ 2 2 n since the subset sum problem is easy to solve when B is extremely large (see Lemma 2.1 ) or small [9] .
Improved reduction from multi-dimensional subset sum problems to lattice problems
It stands to reason that the larger k is, the easier to recover e is. Especially when k ≈ n , one can figure out e simply by solving these linear equations. Without loss of generality, we make an assumption that k ≤ n /3, which is the fault tolerance of consensus protocol in distributed systems [8] .
Now we define the orthogonal lattice and target vector that will be used later. We denote by A ⊥ the lattice
and y ∈ Z n an arbitrary solution to Ax = s . We set the target point t as
By running BDD 1/ γ oracle with input ( A ⊥ , t ), we can recover e with overwhelming probability. The following result is our main conclusion.
There exists an algorithm to find a solution to Ax = s for x ∈ {0, 1} n with overwhelming probability via a single call to BDD 1/2 oracle when k ≥ 3 d, where d = n/ log B is the density. In particular, when
, one can find a solution to Ax = s for x ∈ {0, 1} n with overwhelming probability via a single call to BDD 1/ γ oracle with
With the reduction from
, we can obtain the following corollary directly.
Corollary 3.2.
There exists an algorithm to find a solution to Ax = s for x ∈ {0, 1} n with overwhelming probability via a polynomial number of calls to uSVP γ oracle with
is the density and A is uniformly distributed over [ B ] k × n for log 2 n ≤ log B ≤ 2 n and
Before we prove our main result Theorem 3.1 , it is necessary to explore the random lattice A ⊥ . Over the randomness of A , the probability of an arbitrary z ∈ Z n belonging to A ⊥ is quite crucial in the reduction later. Since the rows of A are independent and identically distributed, we have
Recall the single subset sum problem:
a 1 e 1 + a 2 e 2 + · · · + a n e n = s
) for integer log 2 n ≤ log B < 2 n, e i ∈ {0, 1}. Let a = (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a n ) and e = (e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n ) .
In the analysis of [12] , the probability Pr [ z ∈ a ⊥ ] for arbitrary z ∈ Z n has already been bounded as follows.
Lemma 3.3 ( [12] ) . Given arbitrary
We claim that this bound 1 B can be optimized.
) n where n 2 z ≤ B, we have that
It suffices to prove that
Now we prove the above inequality.
Let z = (z 2 , · · · , z n ) and N z (z 1 ) be the number of vectors x ∈ [ B ] n −1 such that z , x = 0 mod z 1 . Accordingly, we may obtain that
Assuming that B = r 1 z 1 + r 2 with r 2 ∈ [0 , z 1 ) , then we have that for arbitrary
From Eq. (1) , the term n −1 j=1
α(λx j z j+1 ) does not equal 0 if and only if λ = 0 .
Consequently, we get that
Therefore, we have that
Due to the fact that z ∞ ≥ z √ n , we now complete the proof.
Thanks to the independence among the rows of A , we immediately obtain the following result.
) k × n where k ≤ n and n 2 z ≤ B, we have that
Before proving Theorem 3.1 , we need to review a classical problem in number theory. Let r n ( t ) denote the number of representations of non-negative integer t as a sum of n squares, counting permutations and sign changes. Actually r n ( t ) equals the number of integer points on S n −1 ( √ t ) . The general formula of r n ( t ) for even n was stated by Ramanujan [30] , and proved by Mordell [23] . We will give an upper bound of r n ( t ). where C is a positive constant.
Proof.
is the error. It was claimed that δ n (t) = C t n 2 −1 for some positive constant C and e n (t) = O t n 2 −1 − 1 2 n 3 + for those n ≥ 6. As a result, we obtain an upper bound of r n ( t ) for even n : r n (t) ≤ (C + 1) t n 2 −1 . Now we discuss the case where n is odd. We consider the solution to
where C = 2(C + 1) .
Remark 1.
By Gaussian Heuristic, we may evaluate r n ( t ) for t > n 2 by
The estimation of r n ( t ) coincides with that by Gaussian Heuristic for large t . The item
Especially when n is even, the bound Ct n 2 −1 is somewhat explicit, which offers convincing evidence for Gaussian Heuristic.
Proof of Main Theorem
Recall that t = −y + 1 2 1 n where y ∈ Z n is an arbitrary solution to Ax = s and e ∈ {0, 1} n is a small solution to Ax = s .
Then we can derive that dist (t , A ⊥ ) = √ n 2 . Also we notice that e − y is the unique closest vector of A ⊥ to t if k ≥ d , following Theorem 1 in [25] .
We note that the lattice A ⊥ is quite sparse. For random
Since the cardinality of { x ∈ Z n | x ≤ √ n } is less than e 1.4189 n [21] , by Lemma 3.3 , we know that, when
Thus, with 3 d instances, the solution e can be recovered with overwhelming probability via a single call to BDD 1/2 . However, BDD 1/2 is hard that cannot be solved in polynomial time so far.
Indeed for some parameters, the BDD 1/2 oracle can be replaced by BDD 1/ γ with a large γ . Now we are to discuss
With Lemma 3.5 and the observation that S(t, c) = cS(t/c, 1) , it can be derived that when
Due to the fact that the number of c 's such that 0 < lc 2 < R 2 is at most R/ √ l , and z ∞ ≥ z / √ n , we have
We notice that
047 n according to [21] . It is also noted that for l ≥ n , S(
is the set of primitive integer solutions to
−1 by Lemma 3.6 . Combining the fact that
which is negligible since B ≥ 2 log 2 n .
Therefore, when
2 with overwhelming probability for challenges via BKZ-20. We note that the lattice A ⊥ is of rank n − k . Overall, the relation of our reduction in Theorem 3.1 is much more accurate due to the improvement in Lemma 3.4 and should be considered when setting parameters for cryptographic constructions based on subset sum problems.
Broadcast attacks and analysis
In this section, we describe a broadcast attack based on Theorem 3.1 . Given k challenges Ax = s where x ∈ {0, 1} n , we compute a basis B of A ⊥ following the method in [24] and a target vector t = −y + 1 2 1 n where y is an arbitrary solution to Ax = s . We will use lattice basis reduction algorithms (LLL and BKZ) to solve uSVP of the lattice ( B | t ). Similarly, one may apply some other algorithms to solve the BDD instance ( B, t ) directly.
Experimental method and performance
We next report on our experimental results on the broadcast attack. We ran experiments on subset sum instances of various density d and dimension n . For each instance, we measured the minimal k such that the solution can be recovered from k challenges. In our experiments, we added a new challenge if the existing challenges were not enough to recover the solution, which is more appropriate to the situation in real world.
To begin with, we introduce a faster method of computing a basis of orthogonal lattice when new challenge is added.
Given a basis B of A ⊥ and a new challenge ( a , s ), we can easily compute U as the basis of (a T B ) ⊥ . It is easy to verify that BU is a basis of the new lattice A a T ⊥ . We followed the method proposed in [24] but with a smaller scaling factor to obtain a basis of orthogonal lattice. For each pair ( d, n ), we worked on 10 sets of random instances and evaluated the average of the minimal k such that the broadcast attack succeeded with k challenges. We applied LLL algorithm with Lovász parameter 0.9999 and BKZ algorithm with blocksize 20. Fig. 1 shows our practical broadcast attacks against subset sum problems for different parameters. For the case of low density ( d = 1 , 2 ) , it suffices to recover the solution from a small number of challenges using our attack. When d is a monotonically increasing function of n (say d = log n ), the number of required challenges seems large, but still within the range of fault tolerance in some consensus protocols [8] . Therefore, our attack is quite practical. Furthermore, the performance of our broadcast attack is heavily affected by the lattice basis reduction algorithm. Exploiting more advanced algorithms such as BKZ 2.0 [10] , we may achieve higher dimensions with less challenges.
Comparison with other broadcast attacks
In this subsection, we compare our attack with two existing broadcast attacks proposed in [27, 29] from the aspect of the lattice problems that the subset sum problem was reduced to.
Plantard-Susilo's broadcast attack. In [29] , Plantard and Susilo proposed a broadcast attack against GGH and knapsack problem by intersecting the following lattices of dimension n + 2 and rank n + 1 for
They observed that once these L i 's share a same nonzero shortest vector ( e , 0), their intersection lattice L = L i would be of a much larger gap, i.e.
That is why they can recover e with a uSVP oracle to the lattice L .
Pan-Zhang's broadcast attack. The Pan-Zhang's attack [27] against multi-subset sum problem reduced the problem to an SVP instance
where N is a large integer. It is noted that L is of dimension n + k + 1 and rank n + 1 . They proved that when k ≥ 0.9408 d , the multi-subset sum problem can be solved by a single call to SVP algorithm on L .
Recall that we reduce the subset sum problem to BDD instance (L (B ) , t ) where B is a basis of A ⊥ and t = −y + 1 2 1 n for arbitrary y ∈ Z n such that Ay = s . In order to explicitly compare our attack with above attacks, we transform our BDD instance to a uSVP instance
which is of dimension n + 1 and rank n − k + 1 . We claim that L is sparser than L and L . Indeed, our lattice L is a sublattice of both L and L . More precisely, it holds 
These three attacks success only when (e T − Pan-Zhang's attack can successfully recover the solution when k > 0.9408 d , while ours requires k to be larger. However, Pan-Zhang's attack relies on an SVP algorithm which is stronger than BDD or uSVP algorithm in general.
We list the difference of these three attacks in Table 1 .
Defense mechanisms against broadcast attacks
Broadcast attacks apply to the scenario that a same plaintext is encrypted under several public keys. Notice that the efficiency of the broadcast attack is closely related to the number of samples. Theorem 3.1 shows that the more instances the attacker obtains, the easier it is to recover the plaintext. Thus restricting the number of recipients receiving the same plaintext (the parameter k ) may be a feasible method to defense broadcast attack.
Also, the reusage of a plaintext would lead to insecurity, since the ciphertexts can leak the information about the plaintext in multiple encryptions. An effectual approach would be embedding some nonce into the message in encryption algorithm.
Applications to low-weight subset sum problems
In this section, we will discuss the case of low-weight subset sum problems particularly. Low-weight subset sum problems have been used as the foundations of some known cryptographic schemes including Chor-Rivest cryptosystem [11] and Okamoto-Tanaka-Uchiyama(OTU) cryptosystem [26] . Our attacks is applicable to average-case low-weight subset sum problems with certain parameters.
A low-weight subset sum problem is to find a "small" solution to . There are two kinds of encodings
Using our broadcast attack, we can recover the small solution e of low-weight subset sum problems from k challenges, For the binary encoding, we set the target vector t = y − 1 2 1 n and reduce the low-weight subset sum problem to a BDD instance ( A ⊥ , t ) (or corresponding uSVP). For powerline encoding, we reduce it to BDD instance ( A ⊥ , y ) (or corresponding uSVP) directly.
We ran experiments using LLL algorithm with Lovász parameter 0.9999. The dimension n ranges from 40 to 300 by step 20. As explained in [25] , two cases where m = O n log n and m = 2 log c n for c < 1 are worth studying. In our experiments, we set m = n 2 log n and m = 2 log 0 . 75 n with B = n m respectively as a moderate choice, and considered these two cases for both binary and powerline encodings. For each pair ( n, m ), we tested 10 sets of random instances and evaluated the average of the minimal k such that our attack succeeded with k challenges. As shown in Fig. 2 , we only require a small number of challenges to recover the solution, which shows the power of our broadcast attack for low-weight subset sum problem. Moreover, it seems that the number of required challenges increases with growing m , which provides a new evidence to support the rationality of replacing usual density ( d = n log B ) with pseudodensity for low-weight subset sum problem claimed in [25] . However, we note that the pseudo-density d = r log n log B , where r is an upper bound of e 2 , could not be viewed as the only criterion since in our experiments, these cases of different m 's for binary decoding have equal pseudo-densities but diverse hardness.
Discussion on modular subset sum problems
In this section, we are to discuss the broadcast attack against modular subset sum problem, which is quite different from original subset sum problem. Given k challenges of modular subset sum problems
The goal is to find a solution e ∈ {0, 1} n to the equation A q x = s mod q . Similarly, we can define the lattice
We will reduce the multi-dimensional modular subset sum problem
y q is arbitrary solution to A q x = s mod q . To this end, we are to take a further study on the lattice A ⊥ q .
, the following holds on the randomness of
Let q = q/c and z = z /c. Using Eq. (2) , we may obtain that
Since the rows of A q are independent, we complete the proof immediately.
The following result shows a reduction from multi-dimensional modular subset sum problem to BDD. Proof. Let y q ∈ Z n be arbitrary solution to A q x = s and t q = y q − 1 2 1 n . We reduce the multi-dimensional modular subset sum problem to the BDD instance (A ⊥ q , t q ) . It is easy to verify that dist (A ⊥ q , t q ) = √ n 2 . Then we will study the first minimum of lattice A ⊥ q .
We define σ k (q, r) = c| q,c≤r c k , then for R < q we have 
Remark 3.
The above result shows a reduction from ISIS (Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution) to BDD. From another aspect, in a celebrated paper [2] , the author gave a worst-case to average-case reduction from SIVP (Shortest Independent Vectors Problem) to SIS. Actually, this does not lead to a direct reduction from SIVP to BDD, because the dimension with respect to SIVP is k but that with respect to BDD is n under similar parameters, i.e. n = (k log q ) .
Conclusion and future work
We propose a reduction from multi-dimensional subset sum problem to BDD and a practical broadcast attack based on it. Moreover, we apply our method to low-weight subset sum problem and experimentally verify that our attack is quite efficient for suggested parameters.
Our results show some connections among lattice problems of worst-case hardness. It would be interesting to optimize the reduction parameter further. All discussions in this paper focus on generic subset sum problem, thus we leave it as future work to give a detailed cryptanalysis and determine the security parameter of concrete cryptosystems based on our attack. Furthermore, some results may be of independent interest and applicable to general subset sum problems where the solutions are not restricted to {0, 1} n .
